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Abstract We investigate 95 takeovers of property companies all over the world and
find that only two of those are hostile. To determine the effectiveness of the market
for corporate control, we first study characteristics of targets and acquirers compared
to a control sample, using the complete global universe of listed property companies
during the most recent takeover wave (1999–2004). We find that the inefficient
management hypothesis holds for both REITs and non-REITs, as targets exhibit
significant underperformance before takeovers. In the second part of this study, we
investigate shareholder wealth effects following takeovers and confirm previous
findings that abnormal returns for targets and bidders are distinctly different for the
real estate sector. Moreover, we show that this difference not only holds for REIT-to-
REIT mergers, but also for mergers of real estate firms without a REIT-status.
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Introduction
The driving forces of the takeover market have long been subject to academic
interest. Potential motives for takeovers1 include taxes, increase of market power,
diversification of operations, creating synergies, undervaluation of targets and
wealth transfers to stockholders from bondholders or employees (Agrawal and
Jaffe 2003). From a governance point of view, the market for corporate control is
generally regarded as an important disciplinary force (Jensen 1988): the threat of a
takeover might reduce the agency problem by stimulating agents to take decisions
that are in line with the principals’ interest and an actual takeover provides an
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1We use the terms merger, acquisition and takeover interchangeably throughout the paper.
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acquiring firm with the opportunity of restructuring an underperforming target.
This is usually referred to as the inefficient management hypothesis and is regarded
as a prominent motive for takeovers in the literature.
The inefficient management hypothesis has been tested from two different
perspectives. The first approach measures target performance prior to the takeover
announcement, using either stock returns or operating measures of performance.
Regarding this approach, there is no consensus in the literature to whether the inefficient
management hypothesis holds (Agrawal and Jaffe 2003; Schleifer and Vishny 1986).
The second approach tests target and bidder performance around and after the
announcement of the takeover bid. If a takeover indeed corrects failing managers, the
stock return of both acquirers and targets should improve around and after the bid
announcement. In line with expectations, positive total wealth effects are consistently
documented, but wealth effects to acquirers are generally documented to be negative.
This paper elaborates on the inefficient management hypothesis by focussing on
the real estate sector specifically, which is of interest for several reasons. First, the
real estate sector is characterized by a lack of hostile takeovers. This was first
documented for a real estate takeover wave in the 1980s by Allen and Sirmans
(1987), who find that only one event could be classified as a hostile takeover.
Moreover, in a follow-up study, Campbell et al. (2001) find no hostile takeovers at
all in their sample, which covers the 1990–1994 period. The absence of hostile
takeovers in the property sector is contrasting to empirical evidence found for other
sectors; several studies document that hostile takeovers occur frequently (Agrawal
and Jaffe 2003; Morck et al. 1998; Servaes 1991). This might indicate that the
market for corporate control differs from other sectors and that it may not function
properly for the real estate sector. We will investigate this issue further.
Secondly, the inefficient management hypothesis has only been tested partially for
the real estate sector, as to our knowledge no study exists that investigates prior
performance of takeover targets in the real estate sector. Moreover, wealth effects
following takeovers have been studied, but the findings are different in magnitude
and sign compared to other sectors (Allen and Sirmans 1987; Campbell et al. 2001).
This yields the necessity for a detailed study of the takeover market in the real estate
sector, a gap in the empirical knowledge that will be filled by this paper.
Thirdly, corporate governance issues in the real estate sector are especially of
interest, because of the experimental laboratory offered by REITs. The real estate
sector might be less vulnerable to agency problems, due to the possibility for
property companies in several countries to transform into a structure comparable to
the US Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). In this legal framework, up to 100% of
the free cash flow is distributed to the shareholders in exchange for a 0% corporate
tax rate and moreover, restrictions can be imposed on the use of leverage and the
structure of the investor base.2 The unique institutional setting in which REITs
2 The REIT structure is available or will be available shortly in 23 countries, including: USA, Canada,
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, South-Korea, Singapore, Belgium, France, Italy, and The Netherlands. More
countries, such as the UK and Germany are expected to follow. REITs have a 0% corporate tax rate,
provided that they comply with certain regulations. These are country specific, but generally involve
requirements with respect to the composition of the asset portfolio, distribution of profits, shareholder
requirements and financial structure. See Op ‘t Veld (2005) for a detailed description of REIT
characteristics internationally.
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operate leads to a situation in which the free cash flow problem is less of an issue,
thereby reducing agency problems. On the other hand, the imposed dispersion of
ownership might obstruct takeovers (Ghosh and Sirmans 2003). In our detailed study
on the functioning of the real estate takeover market, we will make a comparison
between takeovers of REITs and takeovers of real estate companies without a REIT-
status to investigate how the REIT structure affects the inefficient management
hypothesis.
Lastly, we test whether the inefficient market hypothesis holds for the real estate
sector using an international sample of 95 takeovers over the 1999–2004 period. We
first analyze the financial characteristics of targets and elaborate on existing studies
by also taking other variables than performance characteristics into account.
Furthermore, we include an analysis on the characteristics of bidders. Finally, we
compare targets, acquirers and a control sample using a multinomial logistic
approach and find that, although hostile takeovers are rare in the real estate sector,
the takeover market seems to work effectively as targets are mainly financially
underperforming, small companies that have a low market-to-book value. Moreover,
the financial underperformance of targets seems to hold for REITs as well as non-
REITs.
As a second test of the inefficient market hypothesis, we perform an event study on
abnormal returns surrounding the bid announcement, which shows weak but consistent
results supporting the inefficient management hypothesis, because the positive total
wealth effects we document indicate that shareholders perceive takeovers to be value-
creating rather than value-destroying. We find evidence that shareholder returns for
bidders in the real estate sector are around zero, which is relatively high compared to
findings in the corporate finance literature. Abnormal returns to targets are significantly
positive, although the scope is smaller compared to results previously documented in the
existing finance literature. Finally, the legal structure of targets plays a distinctive role in
the scope of wealth effects following takeovers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. “Literature Review: The Inefficient
Management Hypothesis” provides a short literature overview in which we first discuss
studies on pre-acquisition performance of targets. Secondly, we review the literature on
wealth effects following takeovers. “Data” presents the data and descriptive statistics.
“Drivers of the Takeover Market” discusses the methodology and results on the
analysis of characteristics of targets and bidders compared to a control sample. First,
pre-acquisition performance of targets is studied, followed by a univariate analysis and
finally a multinomial logistic regression. In “Wealth Effects Following Takeovers,” the
results on the analysis of shareholder wealth effects following takeovers are presented,
while the paper ends with a summary and discussion of conclusions in “Conclusions
and Discussion.”
Literature Review: The Inefficient Management Hypothesis
Pre-acquisition Performance of Targets
The inefficient management hypothesis states that inefficient allocation of resources
might lead to underperformance and therefore, takeover activity is believed to be
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motivated by the desire to improve the targets’ performance by improving the
targets’ management (Agrawal and Jaffe 2003). Evidence of the practical application
of this theory is mixed and a comprehensive review is provided in the Appendix of
Agrawal and Jaffe (2003).
In studies which specifically address prior stock performance of targets in
mergers, the evidence for the efficient management hypothesis is not compelling, as
only one study finds significantly negative abnormal return (Asquith et al. 1983)
whereas seven others do not (Agrawal and Jaffe 2003; Agrawal and Walkling 1994;
Asquith and Kim 1982; Ellert 1976; Langetieg 1978; Malatesta 1983; Mandelker
1974). It might be expected that hostile takeovers—often tender offers—rather than
friendly mergers are triggered by poor performance, but in five studies (Dodd and
Ruback 1977; Franks and Mayer 1996; Kini et al. 2004; Martin and McConnell
1991; Smiley 1976) on target performance in tender offers, only Smiley finds that
targets exhibit significantly negative pre-acquisition performance.
Several other studies try to explain takeover probability by using predicting
models and public data, including financial performance measures. For operating
measures of performance, the evidence of underperformance leading to an increased
takeover probability is insignificant as documented by Palepu (1986), Song and
Walkling (1993) and Berger and Ofek (1996), whereas Morck et al. (1998), Barber
et al. (1994), Graham et al. (2002) find that poor performance leads to a higher
probability of becoming a target. With respect to stock measures of performance
Palepu (1986) finds a negative relationship between prior stock performance and
probability of acquisition, whereas Morck et al. (1998) document no significant
influence of abnormal returns on the probability of neither hostile nor friendly
acquisition.
Finally, some papers do not specifically study performance of targets, but use
other measures that are related to the inefficient management hypothesis, mostly
related to corporate governance, for example board composition and ownership
structure (Ambrose and Megginson 1992; Mitchell and Lehn 1990; Morck et al.
1998; North 2001; Shivdasani 1993; Song and Walkling 1993; Weir and Laing
2003). Although some of the studies indeed support the inefficient management
hypothesis, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) note that corporate governance variables might
as well constitute direct evidence due to the correlation with firm performance.
The existing base of literature does not provide consistent evidence in favour of
the efficient management hypothesis. Moreover, no specific research for the real
estate sector has taken place hitherto. The first part of our analysis will therefore
focus on operating and financial measures of performance of targets prior to takeover
bids. Moreover, we will control for variables that might have an influence on
takeover probability, such as board composition, ownership structure and asset
characteristics. Finally, we broaden our analysis to the characteristics of bidders to
get a complete insight in what exactly drives takeovers in the real estate sector.
Shareholder Wealth Effects Following Takeovers
If the efficient management hypothesis holds and thus the objective of a takeover is
to correct for managerial failure, we would not only expect target firms to show poor
performance prior to a takeover bid, but we would also expect positive post-takeover
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wealth effects for bidders and targets. Hitherto, several perspectives on wealth
effects following takeovers have been studied in finance literature, thereby
addressing specific issues such as method of payment (Franks et al. 1988; Travlos
1987), identity of target (Chang 1998), methodology (Asquith et al. 1983), firm size
(Moeller et al. 2004), and the impact of sector-specific characteristics (Allen and
Sirmans 1987; Subrahmanyam and Rangan 1997).
In general, the inefficient management hypothesis is supported by the consistently
significant and positive cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) documented for targets.
For example, Servaes (1991) documents a CAR of 20.5% for all-equity acquisitions
and a CAR of 26.7% for cash bidders, Dodd (1980) reports a 13.4% CAR for a
sample of takeover targets including all methods of payment. For the real estate
sector, McIntosh et al. (1989) report lower gains to bidding firms with a CAR of
6.2%. Campbell et al. (2001) also find positive (3.0%), but relatively low returns to
target shareholders. Campbell (2002) explains these findings by the fact that the
market for corporate control is not very powerful in the listed real estate sector, as
hostile takeovers are completely absent. Moreover, Sirmans (1997) suggests that
corporate governance structures might be less efficient in REITs due to institutional
restrictions, leading to advantages of synergy in mergers to flow to managers rather
than shareholders. These findings indicate that the inefficient management
hypothesis might hold to a lesser extent for the real estate sector than for other
sectors.
If bidders would act in line with the inefficient management hypothesis and
only acquire underperforming companies, the abnormal return for bidders
following acquisition announcements is expected to be positive as well. However,
there is a consensus in the literature that bidders hardly show significantly
positive abnormal returns. Within others, Asquith et al. (1983) find cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) of −2.4%, and Travlos (1987) documents a CAR of
−1.7%. Moreover, shareholder wealth effects accruing to bidders are negatively
influenced by stock as a method of payment, which is often explained by the
information signalling theory of Myers and Majluf (1984). There are some
exceptions to the negative effect on shareholder wealth of acquiring companies
following stock bids; Chang (1998) shows that in takeovers of private firms, stock
as a method of payment leads to positive acquirer returns. This finding is explained
by the positive monitoring effect due to creation of blockholders in the merged
entity and the positive signal of the willingness of well-informed investors to take
a substantial position in an acquiring firm. The second exception to negative
returns for stock-bidders is a study by Allen and Sirmans (1987), who find
nonnegative performance effects for bidders if stock is used as a method of
payment in takeovers. This finding is explained by the reduced cash-generating
ability of REITs.
In a recent study, Campbell et al. (2001) extend the studies of Chang (1998) and
Allen and Sirmans (1987), by exploring the influence of method of payment in both
public–public and public–private takeovers in the REIT-sector. In contrast to Allen
and Sirmans, they find that stock acquisitions in public-to-public REIT mergers lead
to slightly negative results, although the scope of these results is smaller than found
by other studies. Consistent with Chang, they find a positive shareholder wealth
effect following stock bids on private targets.
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The real estate sector with its unique institutional environment has yielded
inconsistent results with respect to shareholder wealth effects following takeovers.
Therefore, we use a global sample of takeovers including the United States, but also
other important real estate markets, such as the UK, The Netherlands and Australia. This
sample allows us to determine whether the distinct abnormal returns documented for the
real estate sector hitherto are REIT or rather real estate specific.
Data
Data and Methodology
Our initial sample consists of 145 takeovers during the 1999–2004 period. These were
identified using data obtained from Global Property Research (GPR) and include all
takeovers involving a public target.3 Contrasting Chang (1998) and Campbell et al.
(2001) we do not include takeovers of privately held companies. This is mainly
because data on takeovers of private real estate targets is hardly available
internationally, which also holds for financial and other information regarding private
firms.4
Transactions on which no financial information could be found or that appeared to be
cancelled or still pending were deleted from the sample. Moreover, the inclusion of
small and less liquid stock markets in our analyses might introduce noise rather than
improve the significance of our findings.5 Therefore, we use a reduced sample
throughout the paper. This sample contains 95 takeovers—of which 51 have a public
acquirer. Countries included are: USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Sweden and The
Netherlands.
In order to get a better insight in the drivers of mergers and acquisitions, we match the
targets and acquirers to a control firm using a temporal matching approach following
Ambrose (1990). The control sample consists of all listed real estate firms in the
selected countries, with a minimal market capitalization of $50 M.6 From this sample
firms are excluded if (1) they are involved in mergers and acquisitions during the
sample period, (2) they are not continuously listed, or (3) the required data is not
available. This leads to a control sample of 103 firms, allowing a control firm to be in
the sample more than once.
Following Franks and Mayer (1996), we examine how long-run pre-acquisition
stock performance differs between targets and non-targets. Moreover, we investigate
3 The sample includes real estate operating companies and REITs, but excludes pure construction and
development companies.
4 We recognize the potential sample bias of not including transactions including private targets, but as we
are interested in stock and operating performance of targets, private targets are less of interest due to non-
availability of this performance data.
5 We repeat our analyses using both the complete sample and the sample that includes a selection of
markets only. The results indeed seem to benefit from the exclusion of small markets.
6 The control sample is provided by GPR and does not include pure construction and development
companies.
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the impact of performance on the likelihood of being involved in a takeover, either as
a target or as an acquirer, while controlling for the impact of other variables. We use a
selection of financial characteristics based on studies described in the literature review,
in particular (Palepu 1986). These variables include leverage, valuation, size, dividend
yield, cash holdings and selling expenditures. Moreover, we include governance and
asset characteristics as control variables, where selection of variables is based on
existing studies as well. More specifically, we include managerial ownership (North
2001; Song and Walkling 1993), block ownership (Schleifer and Vishny 1986),
independence of the board (Shivdasani 1993; Weir 1997) and portfolio characteristics
(Campbell et al. 2001). All variables and their respective sources are listed in
Appendix.
The required financial data are obtained from Datastream, Worldscope and Thomson
Research, whereas details on portfolio composition and ownership structure are hand-
collected from proxy statements, annual reports and GPR Handbooks. In line with
Ambrose (1990), data is collected around an ‘information date’, which is assumed to
be exactly half a year before the announcement date t of a merger or acquisition. In
order to correct for extreme observations, values for daily measured variables are
calculated over a 130-trading day period around the information date and yearly
measured variables are calculated as an average value of the last three years before the
announcement date. Stock performance prior to takeovers is measured on a monthly
basis for various intervals.
Descriptive Statistics
A first analysis of the data reveals the striking finding that our sample includes only two
hostile takeovers. This number is relatively small in a sample of 95 takeovers during the
1999–2004 time period, but is consistent with earlier findings for the real estate sector as
documented by Allen and Sirmans (1987), Campbell et al. (2001) and Campbell
(2002). Explanations for the absence of hostile takeovers in the real estate sector can
be twofold: there is a reduced need for incentive and monitoring mechanisms in the
restricted REIT environment, or, the restricted investor environment of REITs
obstructs hostile takeovers (Ghosh and Sirmans 2003). However, our sample does
not support either of these arguments, since hostile takeovers are also absent in
markets without the REIT structure. The lack of hostile takeovers therefore seems to
be a real estate issue rather than a REIT issue. Further discussion of this finding is
provided in “Conclusions and Discussion.”
Table 1 shows that the sample contains transactions from six different countries,
of which the majority has taken place in the USA, the UK and Australia.
Furthermore, almost half of the mergers and acquisitions involve private acquirers,
which is due to the fact that the real estate sector still consists of a larger non-listed
than listed sector, especially in Europe. Taking a closer look at the private bidders in
Europe, we find a high number of management buyouts in the UK, which might be
explained by the discounts to NAV that are frequently observed for UK listed
property companies over the sample period (Brounen and ter Laak 2005).
Due to the small number of observations, our sample does not include takeovers
taking place in the relatively large listed real estate markets of Asia (e.g. Japan,
Hong Kong, South Korea). The low takeover activity may well be explained by the
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institutional structure in these countries: most of the property companies are part of a
larger conglomerate (e.g. keiretsu or chaebol), which usually owns a majority of the
shares.
Only ten deals in our sample are cross-border. The reason for international
diversification still taking place on a relatively small scale might be the under-
performance real estate firms investing internationally as compared to firms
investing locally (Eichholtz et al. 2001). Eight out of ten international acquisitions
involve an acquirer or target from continental Europe, mostly originating from The
Netherlands. The relatively small size of listed real estate markets in continental
Europe compared to the USA and the UK yields the necessity for European property
companies for cross-border acquisitions. Moreover, there is great potential for deals
within the European Union due to increasing integration of the fragmented national
economies into one single market.
The cyclical nature of merger and acquisition activity in the real estate sector as
described by Campbell (2002) is reflected in Table 2, which shows a clear peak in
Table 1 Characteristics takeover sample (1999–2004)
Country Universe Targets acquirers Method of payment Deal value ($M)
# # Listed Cash Stock Mix Mean SD
North America
USA 139 31 20 15 12 4 822.3 802.7
Canada 22 6 2 4 1 1 341.2 304.6
Europe
The Netherlands 9 6 4 4 2 0 949.2 774.9
Sweden 13 9 2 9 0 0 401.7 402.0
UK 41 29 4 25 2 2 933.1 1747.1
Asia (Pacific)
Australia 26 14 19 5 5 4 563.5 453.9
Totals (%) 250 100% 51% 62% 22% 11% 908.1 1087.8
This table provides descriptive statistics on the takeovers in our sample. We match all deals in the different
countries to the complete universe of property companies in every country (market cap>$50 M, source:
GPR) to get insight in the relative national takeover activity. All targets are publicly listed, for acquirers
the number of listed firms is provided. We distinguish three methods of payment: cash, stock and mixed.










Table 2 Distribution of take-
overs over the sample period
This table shows the distribution
of takeover announcements over
the sample period in absolute
and relative numbers
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acquisition announcements for the years 2000 and 2001, in which almost two-third
of the acquisitions took place. This could be related to the bearish sentiment on the
stock market at those times, which lead to low market-to-book values of property
companies. With respect to possible seasonal effects, we find no distinct pattern in the
distribution over the quarters. Finally, Fig. 1 provides insight in the time to completion
of takeovers in the sample. The time to completion reflects the period between
announcement of the takeover and final acquisition of the shares of the target. As our
sample almost completely exists of friendly takeovers, the average completion time is
short, about 3.5 months, with a majority of the deals closed in less than half a year,
which is in line with findings by Allen and Sirmans (1987). Further analysis of the
relationship between method of payment and the time to completion reveals that a cash
bid leads to a shorter time to completion than alternative methods of payment.
Drivers of the Takeover Market
Pre-acquisition Performance
If the inefficient management hypothesis holds and the takeover market functions
effectively, we would expect poor performance of targets prior to the takeover














































Fig. 1 Time to completion. This figure shows the average time to completion for takeovers in our sample.
Completion time is calculated as number of months between the announcement date and the final
acquisitions date of all target shares
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all targets using a market model, following Franks and Mayer (1996).7 The
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated for various time intervals,
which all stop at month t=−3 to avoid noise due to information leakage in the
months close to the announcement date. Furthermore, we match the sample of
targets to the equivalent part of the control sample. Long-run pre-acquisition
performance of Table 3 shows the results.
We find support for the inefficient management hypothesis in the short run, as
abnormal performance of the targets is negative in the short run and significantly
lower than performance of the control sample. Although targets underperform the
control sample for all intervals in the long run, the significance disappears. Our
results contrast previous literature (e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe 2003; Franks and
Mayer 1996), as the underperformance of targets in the short run has not been
documented before. To test for robustness and to get a better insight in this new
finding, we make a distinction between performance of targets in REIT-REIT
takeovers and performance of targets in non-REIT takeovers. We find that non-
REIT targets exhibit significant underperformance in the short run and strongly
varying performance in the long run. REIT targets underperform the control
sample in the short run as well, but show a more stable performance over the
7 As our sample includes targets from six countries, the use of a single market index would lead to
estimation errors. Therefore, we match the market index to the origin of the target using GPR Local
Indices (available on a monthly basis).
Table 3 Pre-acquisition performance targets
Months around announcement Targets Control sample Difference
t1 t2 CAR (%) t-stat n CAR (%) t-stat n t-stat
Long-run pre-acquisition performance
−3 −12 −3.24 (−1.35) 95 3.05 (1.67)a 101 (2.08)b
−3 −24 −0.46 (−0.12) 87 6.54 (2.01)a 98 (1.41)
−3 −36 6.62 (1.31) 79 13.49 (3.31)b 91 (1.06)
−3 −48 7.38 (1.52) 68 16.86 (3.18)b 83 (1.32)
−3 −60 11.49 (1.98)a 63 22.22 (3.43)b 77 (1.23)
Performance around acquisition
−1 1.24 (1.25) 95 1.60 (1.84)a 103 (−0.55)
+1 9.26 (10.04)b 95 −0.45 (−0.69) 103 (8.63)b
−1 1 10.50 (7.47)b 95 1.82 (1.87)a 103 (5.47)b
Long-run pre-acquisition performance of this table presents the pre-acquisition performance of targets and
the control sample in the long run. CAR is the Cumulated Abnormal Return over the interval as stated in
column 1, where abnormal returns are calculated using a market model based on Franks and Mayer
(1996). Companies are only included in the analysis if they data was available for the specific time
interval. The significance of the difference between performance of targets and the control sample is tested
using a t test assuming unequal variances. Performance around acquisition provides results on
performance of targets and control sample around the bid announcement
a Indicates significance at the 10%-level or less
b Indicates significance at the 5%-level or less
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long run. These results indicate that underperformance of real estate targets prior
to takeovers does not depend on their legal structure.8
In Performance around acquisition of Table 3, we provide a first analysis of target
performance around the bid announcement and find that abnormal returns over the
announcement period are significantly positive, which is in line with existing
literature. We will analyze post-announcement stock performance in more detail in
“Wealth Effects Following Takeovers.”
Univariate Analyses
After the first test of the inefficient management hypothesis, the next step is to
investigate how targets and bidders differ from the control sample, by comparing
financial characteristics, governance structure and portfolio characteristics. This
preliminary analysis is performed by applying a sample t test assuming equal
variances, to compute whether the mean values of the variables differ significantly
between the three groups.9
Regarding operating measures of performance, the results in Table 4 show that the
return on assets and return on equity for targets are significantly lower as compared
to bidders and the control sample. This again confirms the inefficient management
hypothesis and expectations that acquiring firms are better able to generate revenue
with their assets. Our results are in line with the previous analysis on stock
performance of targets, but contrast existing literature, which does not document
operating underperformance of targets (Agrawal and Walkling 1994; Song and
Walkling 1993). Targets pay out less dividends than firms in the control sample,
which might indicate that targets either have less cash available for distribution, for
example due to bad performance, or they retain cash rather than paying out
dividends, which would be line with Jensen’s free cash flow theorem (1986).
Furthermore, the variable on financial structure (leverage) indicates that targets are
significantly more levered than non-targets and bidders. This result is in line with
previous real estate research (Ambrose 1990; Campbell et al. 2001), and consistent
with the synergy theory, which suggests that bidders prefer to acquire companies
with a different financial structure. Moreover, the indebtness of targets combined
with evidence on underperformance and low dividend yield, suggests that takeover
targets are in a weak financial position.
The low beta for targets, bidders and the control sample suggests that real estate
companies are less sensitive to market movements than firms in other sectors, with
8 In our comparison of REIT vs non-REIT takeovers, we assume that potential differences are driven by
the REIT-structure. However, differences between the two groups might as well be attributed to country-
specific characteristics, as the non-REIT sample is dominated by UK firms. The limited number of non-
REITs in the USA restricts in-country comparison between REITs and non-REITs, but the recent adoption
of the REIT structure in several Asian and European countries may enable future analysis on the impact of
the REIT structure on corporate governance issues such as the market for corporate control.
9 We stress that the means we compute are only meant to be suggestive, because we do not account for
important differences between firms in the calculations. Therefore, some of the correlations might be
spurious. Moreover, we do not make a distinction between REIT mergers and non-REIT mergers. We will
deal with these issues in the logistic regression and assume the results presented next to be indicators of
causal relationships between the variables and takeover probability.
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bidding firms even less risky than target firms. Furthermore, the average size of
bidders is almost three times as large as the average size of the targets and control
firms. This is in line with expectations that large companies have more market power
to engage in acquisitions and are better able to integrate acquired assets in their
operations. We compare our average target size ($554 M) to other studies and find
that targets in our sample are slightly smaller as compared to both other real estate
studies (Campbell et al. 2001: $650 M) and more general takeover studies
(Mikkelson and Partch 1989: $787 M; Song and Walkling 1993: $727 M). This is
probably due to the inclusion of European companies in our sample, which generally
have a smaller size. Finally, the low market-to-book value frequently observed for
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of targets, bidders and the control sample
Variables Control group Targets Acquirers t-statistic







Stock performance 3.05 18.25 −3.24 22.48 4.34 10.76 2.08a −2.61a −0.53
Return on assets 7.06 2.93 6.01 3.05 7.69 3.83 2.41a −2.60a 1.00
Return on equity 10.27 7.89 7.66 8.83 10.71 6.87 2.11a −2.21a −0.34
Funds from
operations
0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 2.76a −0.71 0.59
EPS growth 0.31 0.70 0.27 0.66 0.39 0.65 0.38 0.94 −0.59
Dividend yield 7.29 4.18 5.40 3.43 5.89 3.16 3.44a −0.85 2.29a
Selling
expenditures
1.17 0.02 1.15 0.02 1.11 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.18
Cash holdings 3.60 4.80 2.75 3.86 2.88 4.88 1.34 −0.16 0.83
Leverage 1.13 0.76 1.26 1.20 0.77 0.77 −0.88 2.91a 2.68a
Beta 0.45 0.33 0.39 0.20 0.29 0.21 1.42 2.67a 3.51a
Market value ($M) 552.85 567.38 553.72 736.21 1599.25 1952.61 1.17 −4.63a −3.94a
Market-to-book
value
1.24 0.92 0.97 1.08 1.10 0.65 1.90b −0.88 1.14
Governance characteristics
Blockholdings 0.29 0.18 0.36 0.20 0.31 0.21 −2.37a 1.35 −0.46
Insider holdings 0.28 1.42 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.17 1.35 −0.62 1.20
% non-executives 0.48 0.13 0.41 0.27 0.60 0.19 1.86b −3.87a −3.15a
In-house
management
0.88 0.32 0.78 0.42 0.88 0.33 1.96a 1.65b 0.02
Liquidity 0.55 1.34 0.99 2.38 0.51 0.60 −1.59 1.85b 0.25
Portfolio characteristics
Office 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 −0.57 −1.28 −1.56
Retail 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.47 0.50 −2.47a −3.02a −1.28
Residential 0.17 0.38 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 1.92b −0.27 1.36
Diversified 0.26 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.24 0.43 −1.45 1.58 0.36
International 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.22 0.42 −0.66 1.49 1.99a
Development 0.14 0.34 0.74 0.44 0.18 0.39 −10.60a 7.95a −0.64
In this table, descriptive statistics and the preliminary results of the comparison between targets, acquirers
and control group are provided. Absolute values of variables are reported in nominal dollars. The last
columns show the t-statistics of the paired sample t test, assuming unequal variances. The definitions of all
variables are provided in Appendix
a Indicates significance at the 5%-level or less
b Indicates significance at the 10%-level or less
152 P.M.A. Eichholtz, N. Kok
listed property companies is again documented in our descriptive statistics, which
indicate that real estate targets trade at a small discount on average.
Besides financial characteristics, we include control variables on corporate
governance characteristics as the lack of hostile takeovers in the real estate sector
may enhance the need for alternative governance mechanisms (Whidbee 1997).
First, the percentage of shares in the hands of the three largest shareholders is
significantly higher for targets, which is in line with Shivdasani (1993), who finds
that large shareholders play an active role as a monitoring mechanism by facilitating
takeovers. Targets have a significantly lower percentage of non-executive directors
on the board as compared to non-targets, which provides support for the hypothesis
that target firms have a weaker internal governance structure. Finally, the results
show that targets are more often externally managed than control firms and bidders.
This is in line with Ambrose and Linneman (2001), who find that externally
managed REITs are less competitive than internally managed REITs.
Lastly, the descriptive statistics show that portfolio characteristics differ
significantly between targets, bidders and the control sample. Bidders are more
often international companies than targets or control firms. This suggests that the
local knowledge that is required for cross-border investments makes the acquisition
of a foreign company a useful tool. With respect to the portfolio of bidders and
targets, the results show that takeover targets are mostly real estate companies with a
diversified portfolio, involved in development activities, which is in line with
expectations, as diversification of operations rather than focussing on a single asset
or activity is often associated with underperformance. Acquirers seem to have an
investment focus on retail and office property.
Multivariate Results
In order to estimate the joint impact of the previously discussed variables on the
probability of a takeover attempt, we use a multinomial logistic regression model.
We follow a broad stream of literature by comparing characteristics of acquired firms
to a sample of control firms, and moreover, we extend the traditional methodology
(Ambrose 1990; Barnes 1999; Dietrich and Sorensen 1984; Palepu 1986) by
including bidders. To solve the problem of multicollinearity, we perform a stepwise
regression of correlated variables and use the residuals in the multinomial analysis.
To interpret the results correctly, we should point out that the focus of interest of our
study is the significance of the estimated coefficients of the variables and not the
predictive ability of the model (Palepu 1986). Therefore, the coefficients do not have
economic significance except for their sign.
Table 5 presents the logistic regression results. We confirm previous findings that, in
line with the inefficient management hypothesis, weak operating and stock performance
of real estate companies are positively related to takeover likelihood. The significantly
negative coefficients for both operating and stock performance are not consistently
documented in the corporate finance literature. For bidders, size is positively related to
the probability of being an acquirer, indicating that large firms may have efficiencies
and resources that make them more likely to acquire other firms (Trahan 1993).
To check for robustness of the results and to account for the different legal
structure of REITs compared to non-REITs, we repeat the analysis for REIT-REIT
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takeovers and non-REIT takeovers separately.10 In general, our findings are similar
to the results reported in Table 5, and most importantly, the repeated analysis
confirms that the financial performance of targets in both samples is significantly
negatively related to the takeover probability. Therefore, we confirm our previous
findings that the inefficient management holds for REIT takeovers as well as non-
REIT takeovers. One main difference is that low cash holdings lead to an increased
takeover probability in REIT takeovers, which is not documented for non-REIT
mergers. As REITs face the obligatory payout of cash flows, cash-trapped firms
cannot easily solve financial problems and are therefore, combined with poor
performance, more vulnerable to takeovers.
The signs of the corporate governance variables mainly confirm the results of
the univariate analysis. For targets, the variable on insider holdings is now
significantly negative, which suggests that increased managerial stockholdings
deter takeovers. This might indicate that large inside shareholdings entrench
managers rather than reduce the agency gap (North 2001; Song and Walkling
Table 5 Results multinomial logistic regression
Intercept Targets Acquirers
1.81 (1.10) −6.36 (−3.02)a
Financial characteristics
Market value (log) −0.03 (−0.19) 0.65 (3.01)a
Stock return −3.12 (−2.77)a 1.58 (0.97)
Return on assets −0.16 (−2.12)a 0.07 (0.92)
Cash holdings −0.09 (−1.59) −0.04 (−0.72)
Leverage −0.04 (−0.15) −0.56 (−1.70)b
Beta −2.98 (−2.77)a −2.63 (−2.02)a
Governance characteristics
% non-executives −0.94 (−0.85) 3.93 (2.66)a
Insider holdings −1.40 (−2.55)a 0.12 (0.18)
In-house management −1.97 (−1.57) 0.01 (0.04)
Blockholdings 2.82 (2.45)a −0.61 (−0.51)
Liquidity 0.09 (0.69) −0.01 (−0.04)
Portfolio characteristics
Diversified 0.07 (0.12) 0.92 (1.37)
Office −0.01 (−0.02) 1.57 (2.00)a
Retail −0.63 (−1.08) 2.19 (3.48)a
Development 3.50 (6.98)a 0.03 (0.04)




This table shows the results for the multinomial logistic regression. Column 2 includes the regression
results for targets, whereas column 3 includes the regression results for acquirers. The pseudo R-square is
the analogue of the R2 in the normal linear regression model. The chi-square tests the null hypothesis that
all parameters in the model are zero and is the equivalent of the F test in the normal regression model. The
null-hypothesis is rejected in all models
a Indicates significance at the 5%-level or less
b Indicates significance at the 10%-level or less
10 For reasons of space, results are not reported, but these are available upon request.
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1993). This adds to earlier evidence by Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), who partially
explain the absence of hostile takeovers for REITs by the negative effects of larger
insider shareholdings. The presence of large blockholders increases the likelihood
of becoming a takeover target, which suggests that large shareholders are effective
monitoring mechanisms (North 2001; Shivdasani 1993). Furthermore, we find that
property companies with an independent board have an increased likelihood to be
bidders in takeovers.
We repeat the multinomial regression analysis for REIT takeovers and non-
REIT takeovers separately and find that the relationship between governance and
takeover likelihood is different for REIT targets as compared to non-REIT
targets, whereas for bidders this relationship is similar for REITs and non-REITs.
First, we documented previously that the presence of large blockholders
increases the takeover likelihood for targets, but this result seems to be driven
by the REITs in our sample. This is counterintuitive, as it is often argued that the
5–50 rule imposed on REITs limits the creation of large shareholders and thus
hinders hostile takeovers (Ghosh and Sirmans 2003). However, our result is in
line with Ling and Ryngaert (1997), who state that larger blocks of shares held by
outsiders might facilitate takeovers, both because of lower transaction costs and by
reducing free-rider problems by small shareholders. Second, we find evidence for
REITs that a relatively low number of non-executives on the board increase the
takeover likelihood, which is consistent with Weir (1997) and North (2001). They
document that non-executives are only weakly represented on the boards of targets,
potentially leading to weaker boards and thus less efficient monitoring. Third, the
negative sign for insider shareholdings is documented for REIT takeovers as well
as non-REITs takeovers.
Finally, the results on portfolio characteristics reveal that targets and bidders
are only slightly different from the control sample. Property companies with
operations involving development activities face an increased takeover likeli-
hood. Furthermore, the coefficient on the market-to-book value is significantly
negative for targets. This result is not surprising and indicates that the market-to-
book value is a driver of takeovers within the real estate sector, even though
there may be large cross-country differences and variations over time. Real estate
companies with a focus on retail and office property have an increased likelihood
to be bidders, which is in line with anecdotal evidence that retail mergers are
prevailing in the USA.
We again compare between REIT takeovers and non-REIT takeovers and find
that targets in non-REIT mergers have a significantly negative coefficient for
the market-to-book value, whereas this result does not hold for REITs. This
difference might be due to the transparency of REITs as compared to non-
REITs, which leads to less information asymmetry between firms and
shareholders. Therefore, the market is able to price REITs more accurately
than non-REITs.
The analysis of the characteristics of bidders and targets in real estate takeovers
has revealed interesting results, which have not been documented for the real estate
sector before. Although the consistently documented absence of hostile takeovers in
the real estate sector lead to expectations that the market for corporate control does
not work properly for the property sector, our results confirm the inefficient
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management hypothesis: targets in the real estate takeover market are under-
performing firms. This suggests that the market for corporate control is effective in
the real estate sector, even without the threat of hostile takeovers.
Wealth Effects Following Takeovers
The former section provided insight in the underlying drivers of real estate takeovers,
thereby focussing on pre-acquisition characteristics of targets and bidders to get an
insight in the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in the real estate sector.
This section elaborates on the previous section by studying the wealth effects
surrounding the announcement of a takeover bid. Following the inefficient
management hypothesis, the takeover of underperforming targets should lead to
positive wealth effects for both targets and bidders. This section will start with a short
discussion of methodological issues; hereafter the event study results are presented.
Methodology
The impact of acquisitions on the shareholder wealth of acquirers and targets can be
determined using several event study methods, among which the OLS market model
and the comparison period approach (Brown and Warner 1980). Although the OLS
market model has been used in comparable studies, for example Chang (1998) and
Campbell et al. (2001), our sample seems to be better suited to the comparison
period approach. The acquisitions in our sample take place in several different
countries, which leads to difficulties in using a single market index. Moreover, the
use of several different market indices for the various markets leads to an estimation
error, because the disturbance term is affected by other factors in addition to the
announcements under study, such as macro-economic movements, which might
differ significantly across countries. Another issue is the relative illiquidity of a
substantial part of the stocks in our sample in comparison to the matched market
index, leading to the estimation of unreliable market factors. Finally, the choice for
the comparison period method is justified by Brown and Warner (1980), who argue
that the comparison period returns approach is at least as powerful as and often even
more powerful as market adjusted approaches.
We estimate the mean return (μit) of each security i for a comparison period
running from day −120 through day −20 prior to the day of the first public
announcement (t=0). The event period disturbance term can than be estimated by
subtracting μit from the realized return Rit. We measure announcement-period returns
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We assume that the portfolio daily returns are normally distributed and
stationary, which allows us to use a significance test for the null hypothesis of
equality of event period and comparison period means based on the methodology
of Mood-Graybill-Boes (1974).
Results
Table 6 shows the average abnormal returns for bidding and target firms, subject to
the method of payment and the identity of the merger (REIT-REIT or non-REIT
mergers). Target firms provides the two and three day CARs for acquisition targets,
which are significantly positive (8.66%) for the sample as a whole. The wealth
effects we find are substantially higher than results reported by Campbell et al.
(2001) and McIntosh et al. (1989), although these authors use a market model and
do not distinguish between stock and cash payments. Compared to more general
corporate finance studies, our results are lower than the 10 to 23% as found by for
example Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Servaes (1991). The lower level of our
results may well be caused by the homogeneity of assets of real estate companies,
which decreases the potential for synergy profits emerging from merged
operations.
Studying the abnormal returns to targets in more detail, we find that targets
receiving a bid from a private firm receive higher abnormal returns in
comparison to targets receiving a public bid. This might be due to the fact that
the main part of private bids in our sample consists of MBOs: as the
management of a company has superior knowledge of the firm, they will be
best able to establish the exact value of the company and to create value
following a takeover. Furthermore, we find that the scope of wealth effects for
targets in REIT takeovers is different compared to wealth effects for targets in
non-REIT takeovers. CARs in REIT takeovers financed with stock are quite
similar to previous findings in the real estate literature, for example, Campbell et
al. (2001) document a three day CAR of 3.2%. However, we document CARs for
cash bids that are substantially higher. This is in line with academic evidence that
cash bids lead to higher CARs than stock bids, due to signalling effects (Myers and
Majluf 1984). However, this result has not been documented before, because
previous comparable studies included stock-financed REIT takeovers only.
Finally, stock bids in non-REIT takeovers lead to insignificant wealth effects. On
the one hand, the low number of stock bids in non-REIT mergers might be a driver
of this result, but it might as well be an indicator for the aversion of shareholders
against stock as a method of payment. This result is contrasting the significant
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wealth effects following stock-financed REIT takeovers. The latter might well be
due to the fact that REITs are restricted in retaining cash, which leaves managers
nothing but stock as a method of payment in takeovers.
Bidding firms presents the shareholder wealth effects accruing to the bidders and
shows that cash bidders earn an insignificant 0.33% abnormal return. Stock bidders
earn a 0.48% return, but this result is insignificant as well. The performance of the
bidders in our sample is lower than the 6.37% CAR documented by Allen and
Sirmans (1987), but is slightly better than results found by Campbell et al. (2001),
who document a −0.6% abnormal return. Again, these comparisons should be
interpreted with care due to the difference in methodology. Our results confirm that
takeovers in the listed real estate sector lead more favourable stock market reactions
for bidders compared to findings in other sectors: Asquith et al. (1983), Travlos
(1987), Hyun (1993) and Chang (1998) all find significantly negative bidder wealth
effects for both stock and cash offers.
The findings of our event study show that takeovers in the real estate sector lead
to significantly positive aggregate wealth effects, which confirms the inefficient
management hypothesis. The results are generally in line with the real estate
Table 6 Shareholder wealth effects for targets and bidders following takeovers
Number CAR CAR
t [−1, 0, 1] t [0, +1]
Target firms
All bids 95 8.66% (3.23)a 8.21% (6.76)a
Cash bids 63 10.86% (3.27)a 10.46% (7.21)a
Stock/mixed bids 32 4.35% (1.92)b 3.79% (3.14)a
Public bidder 51 6.95% (3.00)a 6.72% (6.38)a
Private bidder 44 10.10% (3.04)a 10.24% (6.02)a
REIT takeovers 43 6.69% (3.25)a 6.92% (6.77)a
Cash 15 10.19% (3.06)a 10.39% (7.67)a
Stock/mixed 28 4.80% (2.14)a 4.21% (3.66)a
Non-REIT takeover 37 10.15% (3.05)a 10.27% (6.02)a
Cash bids 33 11.33% (3.12)a 10.27% (6.27)a
Stock/mixed bids 4 0.06% (0.37) −0.05% (−0.01)
Bidding firms
All offers 51 0.37% (0.39) 0.48% (0.86)
Cash offers 20 0.33% (0.28) 0.34 (0.42)
Stock offers 31 0.48% (0.22) 0.80% (0.58)
REIT takeovers 43 0.27% (0.23) 0.77% (0.50)
Cash 14 0.14% (0.35) 0.89% (0.64)
Stock 29 0.23% (0.19) 0.31% (0.44)
Non-REIT takeovers 8 1.51% (0.57) 1.40% (1.07)
This table presents the results of the event study on the wealth effects following takeovers in the real estate
sector. Target firms reports the average 3-day and 2-day cumulative abnormal return to targets, thereby
distinguishing cash bids and bids which are (at least partially) stock-financed. Moreover, we make a
distinction between REIT-to-REIT takeovers and takeovers involving non-REITs. Bidding firms presents
the event study results for bidders. Tstatistics are based on a conventional significance test for the null
hypothesis of equality of event period and comparison period means, based on methodology of Mood-
Graybill-Boes (1974, p. 435)
a Indicates significance at the 5%-level or less
b Indicates significance at the 10%-level or less
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takeover literature, but we contribute to existing studies by including wealth effects
following mergers of non-REITs. With respect to these mergers, we document larger
CARs as compared to REIT mergers. Our findings differ from the finance literature,
where larger gains to targets and larger losses to bidders have been documented. Our
findings of small rather than large fluctuations in stock prices of targets and bidders
seems to be justified by the homogeneity of operations in real estate mergers, which
does not allow for large value-creating synergies.
Conclusions and Discussion
The different aspects of the market for corporate control have been studied extensively
in the corporate finance literature and to some extent in the real estate literature. This
paper adds to existing evidence by investigating the inefficient management
hypothesis for the real estate sector during the most recent takeover wave, using an
international sample. The real estate sector provides an interesting and increasingly
important field of research, both because of the trend in institutionalization of the real
estate sector and because of its distinct governance structure. Moreover, the
documented lack of hostile takeovers for the real estate sector leads to the question
whether the market for corporate control functions effectively in the property sector.
Our results indicate that, although the market for corporate control in the real estate
sector does not discipline managers via hostile takeovers, poor firm performance is a
predominant motive for takeovers. This confirms the inefficient management
hypothesis and thereby adds new evidence to the existing real estate finance literature.
However, the question why hostile takeovers do not take place in the real estate sector
still remains unanswered. We suggest three explanations for this.
First, hostile takeovers do probably not create more value than friendly takeovers.
The lack of hostile takeovers in the real estate sector does not allow for empirical
testing of this hypothesis, but Schwert (2000) indeed finds that hostile bids have
lower success rates and on average pay a higher premium to target shareholders.
Second, the most important characteristic of hostile takeovers is the information
asymmetry that arises when a hostile bid is made. Despite this information
asymmetry, managers are often willing to take the risk of overpaying because this
premium will be offset by growth in future revenues. The information problem is
relatively small in the real estate sector as the valuation of operations (i.e. a property
portfolio) is rather straightforward. Therefore, we would expect a large number of
hostile takeovers. However, in the real estate sector the growth of revenues is rather
predictable and stable, so although the information asymmetry is less of a problem in
hostile takeovers, it will take considerable time to regain possible overpayments in
the real estate sector, making it an unattractive alternative to friendly takeovers.
Our third hypothesis is that the REIT structure increases transparency, which is so
beneficial to corporate governance that it makes the market for corporate control less
important as a governance mechanism. Or inversely, the REIT structure may
decrease transparency due to dispersed stock ownership, thereby deterring hostile
takeovers (Ghosh and Sirmans 2003). However, our sample shows that hostile
takeovers do not take place in real estate markets without the REIT structure either,
which suggests that the operations of real estate companies, whether they have a
How Does the Market for Corporate Control Function for Property Companies? 159
REIT-status or not, are relatively transparent. This reduces the need for an active
market for corporate control by means of hostile takeovers.
The latter part of our study shows that the real estate takeover market does not
only differ from other sectors with respect to hostile takeovers, but wealth effects
surrounding takeovers are different as well. We document abnormal returns of a
smaller scope as compared to wealth effects found in studies for other sectors,
which is consistent with previous studies on takeovers in the real estate sector
(Allen and Sirmans 1987; Campbell et al. 2001). The smaller scope of the wealth
effects might be justified by the homogeneity in operations of real estate
companies, which does not allow for large synergy benefits following mergers.
Concluding, we can state that our findings indicate that the lack of hostile
takeovers in the real estate sector does not by definition lead to a weak market for
corporate control, as underperforming targets face an increased takeover likelihood.
However, the exact reason for the lack of hostile takeovers is still hard to establish.
The illiquidity of some of the smaller international real estate markets hinders a
complete international study of the real estate takeover market and the use of a
market model to establish shareholder wealth effects, thereby opening possibilities
for future research. Furthermore, we investigate the takeover market as an important
external governance mechanism, but apart from studying how governance structures
differ between targets and bidders, we do not address interaction between external
governance, internal governance and equity prices, which have recently been shown
to be interrelated (Cremers and Nair 2005). This might be an interesting venue for
corporate governance research in real estate, because of the experimental laboratory
offered by REITs and its distinct impact on corporate governance mechanisms.
Finally, we study wealth effects following takeovers in the short run only. A long-
run perspective could possible provide better insights in the wealth effect differences
between takeovers in the real estate sector and results documented for takeovers in
other sectors.
Acknowledgement We acknowledge the helpful comments of Martin Hoesli, Simon Stevenson,
Tony Key and an anonymous referee, as well as seminar and conference participants at Cass
Business School, Université de Liège, HEC Geneva and the 2005 ERES Conference, Dublin. We
also thank Jeroen Beimer (Global Property Research) for his efforts in data collection. All
remaining errors are ours.
Appendix
Table 7 Explanatory variables
Variable Definition Source Based on
item
Financial characteristics
Stock return Monthly stock return Datastream RI
Return on assets Net income divided by total assets Worldscope WC08326
Return on equity Net income divided by total equity Worldscope WC08301
Growth in EPS Earnings per share growth during 3
financial years before t
Datastream EPS
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